Polybius
3.50-55
translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert
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Livy 21.32.6-37.6
translated by Aubrey de
Sélincourt
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DAY 1
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[32] From the
Druentia Hannibal advanced towards the
Alps mainly through open country, and reached the foothills without
encountering
any opposition from the local tribes. The nature of the mountains was
not,
of course, unknown to his men by rumor and report - and rumor commonly
exaggerates the truth; yet in this case all tales were eclipsed by the
reality. The dreadful vision was now before their eyes: the towering
peaks,
the snow clad pinnacles soaring to the sky, the rude huts clinging to
the
rocks, beasts and cattle shriveled and parched with cold, the people
with
their wild and ragged hair, all nature, animate and inanimate, stiff
with
frost: all this, and other sights the horror of which words cannot
express,
gave a fresh edge to their apprehension.
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[50] Hannibal began
his ascent (anabole) of the
Alps and soon found himself beset with great dangers. So long as the Carthaginians
had remained in the plains the various chieftains of the Allobroges had
left them alone because of their fear both of the Carthaginian cavalry
and also of the barbarian troops who were escorting them. But as soon
as
the latter had set off for home and Hannibal's troops began to advance
into difficult country, the Allobrogian chiefs gathered a large force
and
took up commanding positions alongside the road by which the
Carthaginians
would have to climb.
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As
the column moved forward up the first slopes,
there appeared, right above their heads, ensconced upon their
eminences,
the local tribesmen, wild men of the mountains, who,
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If they had only
kept their plans secret, they would
have completely destroyed the Carthaginian army. But in the event their
scheme became known, and though the Celts inflicted heavy casualties on
Hannibal's troops, they suffered at least as many themselves.
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if
they had chosen to lurk in clefts of the
hills, might well have sprung out from ambush upon the marching column
and inflicted untold losses and disaster.
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Hannibal received
intelligence that the barbarians had
seized these points of vantage and he pitched camp
at the foot of
the pass; there he halted while he sent forward some of his Gallic
guides
to reconnoitre the ground and report on the enemy's dispositions and
the
general situation.
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afternoon
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Hannibal
soon ordered a halt and sent his
Gallic guides forward to reconnoitre.
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His
orders were carried out, and he then discovered
that it was the enemy's habit to remain under arms in their positions
and
guard them carefully during the daytime, but to withdraw at night to a
neighboring town.
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NIGHT
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Informed that he
could not get through there, he encamped
in the best stretch of fairly level ground he could find, hemmed in
though
it was by savagely broken rocks and precipitous cliffs. Later he
learned
from the same guides, whose way of life and language were much like
those
of the local tribesmen, and who had been able, in consequence, to
listen
to their deliberations, that the pass was held only in the daytime, and
that at nightfall the natives dispersed to their homes.
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So
Hannibal revised his plans in the light
of this report and devised the following stratagem. He advanced with
his
whole army quite openly, and when he approached the part of the road
where
further movement would be threatened, he pitched camp only a short
distance
from the enemy.
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DAY 2
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In view of this
information, at dawn next morning
he approached the eminences where the tribesmen were on watch as if
with
the intention of openly trying to force a passage through the defile
during
the hours of daylight. During the rest of the day he concealed his
actual
purpose; his men fortified the position where they had originally
halted,
and it was not till he was sure that the tribesmen had abandoned the
heights
and gone off guard that his real intention became evident.
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As
soon as it was dark, he gave orders
for watch fires to be lit and left the greater part of his troops in
camp.
He then led forward a picked force of lightly armed men, and passing
through
the defile seized the positions which the enemy had just left on
withdrawing
into the town according to their usual habit.
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NIGHT
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Leaving the baggage
in camp with all the cavalry and
most of the infantry, and kindling, for a blind, more fires
than
the numbers actually left in camp would justify, he assembled a force
of
light armed infantrymen, all men picked for their courage and
determination,
swiftly cleared the defile, and established himself on the heights
which
the tribesmen had been holding.
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[51]
At daybreak the barbarians saw
what had happened, and at first did nothing to press their attack. But
later, as they watched the long train of pack animals and horsemen
slowly
and painfully making their way up the narrow track, they were tempted
by
this opportunity to harass the advance.
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DAY 3
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[33] At
dawn next morning camp was broken up and
the rest of the army moved forward. The tribesmen were beginning to
muster
at their usual look-out station on the heights when, to their
astonishment,
they saw the Carthaginian assault troops right above their heads and
already
in possession of it, while another army of them was passing through
along
the track. The two things together were such a shock to them that for
the
moment they were frozen into immobility; soon, however, the sight of
the
enemy's own difficulties restored their confidence.
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When
they went into action and attacked at
several different points at once, the Carthaginians suffered heavy
losses,
especially of their horses and baggage mules, and this was not so much
at the hands of the enemy as because of the nature of the ground. The
road
leading up to the pass was not only narrow and uneven but flanked with
precipices, and so the least movement or disorder in the line caused
many
of the animals to be forced over the edge with their loads.
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In
the narrow pass the marching column was
rapidly losing cohesion; there was great confusion and excitement
amongst
the men, and still more amongst the terrified horses, so the tribesmen,
in the hope that any hostile action by themselves would be enough to
complete
their discomfiture, came swarming down the rocky and precipitous
slopes,
sure-footed as they were from long familiarity with their wild and
trackless
terrain. The Carthaginians thus found themselves facing two enemies -
the
hostile tribesmen and the terrible difficulty of their position in the
narrow defile. It was a case of every man for himself, and in their
struggles
to get clear of danger they were fighting with each other rather than
with
the enemy.
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It
was chiefly the horses which brought about
this confusion whenever they were wounded: some of them, maddened by
the
pain, would wheel round and collide with the baggage mules, while
others,
rushing on ahead, would thrust aside anything that stood in their way
on
the narrow path, and so throw the whole line into disarray.
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It was the horses,
more than anything else, which created
havoc in the column: terrified by the din, echoing and re-echoing from
the hollow cliffs and woods, they were soon out of control, while those
which were struck or wounded lashed out in an agony of fear, causing
serious
losses both of men and gear of all descriptions. In the confusion many
non-combatants, and not a few soldiers, were flung over the sheer
cliffs
which bounded each side of the pass, and fell to their deaths thousands
of feet below; but it was worst for the pack-animals - loads and all,
they
went tumbling over the edge almost like falling masonry.
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When
Hannibal saw this, he realized that even
those who survived this ambush would have no chance of safety if their
baggage train were destroyed, and so he took command of the body of
troops
which had seized the enemy's positions on the previous night, and
hurried
to the rescue of those at the head of the column.
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All this was a
shocking spectacle; nevertheless Hannibal,
watching from above, stayed for the moment where he was and kept his
assault
troops in check, lest their joining the column should only add to the
confusion.
But when he saw the column break up, and realized that even to get the
men through safely would not help him much if all their gear were lost,
he knew it was time to act. Hurrying down from his position on the
heights,
he scattered the hostile tribesmen with a single charge.
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He killed great
numbers of the Allobroges, as he had
the advantage of attacking them from higher ground, but the losses were
equally heavy among his own troops, since the turmoil and the
mêlée
in his main column were greatly increased, and now came from both
directions
at once on account of the shouts and struggles of those who were
fighting
higher up the slope. It was only when he had killed most of the
Allobroges
and driven off the rest in headlong retreat towards their own territory
that the horses and the survivors of the mule train could make their
way
slowly and with great difficulty over the dangerous stretch of the path.
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His
arrival did, indeed, increase the confusion
amongst his own men, but only for a moment; for once the enemy had fled
and the track was clear, order was restored, and it was not long before
the whole army, unmolested and almost in silence, was brought safely
through.
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After this action
Hannibal rallied as many of his troops
as he could, and attacked the town from which the enemy had made their
sortie. He found it almost empty, as all the inhabitants had been lured
out by the prospect of easy plunder, and he at once took possession of
it.
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The
chief fortified village of the district,
together with the neighboring hamlets, was then captured,
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The seizure of this
place brought him several immediate
as well as future advantages: he recovered a number of his baggage
mules
and horses, and many of the men who had been captured with them, and
found
a supply of cereals and of cattle to last him for two or three days.
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and
the cattle and grain taken from these
places proved sufficient to feed the army for three days.
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But an even more
important gain was that his victory
inspired such fear among the tribes in the vicinity that none of those
who lived near the ascent were likely to dare to attack him again.
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As
the tribesmen had learnt their lesson,
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[52] He proceeded to
pitch camp there and rested for
a day before resuming his march. For the following three days
he
led his army safely over the next stretch of their route,
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DAYS 4-6
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and
the going was now comparatively easy,
the army during these three days made considerable
progress.
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but on the
fourth he once more found himself in
great danger. The tribes which lived near the pass joined forces to lay
a treacherous plot against him.
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DAY 7
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[34]
Coming to the territory of another mountain
tribe, a numerous one for this sort of country, Hannibal encountered no
open resistance, but fell into a cunningly laid trap.
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In fact he nearly
succumbed to the very tactics in which
he himself excelled.
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They came out to
meet him carrying branches and wreaths,
which are recognized among almost all the barbarian peoples as tokens
of
friendship, just as Greeks use the herald's staff. Hannibal, however,
was
inclined to be suspicious of the good faith of these people, and took
especial
pains to discover what were their intentions and the meaning of this
approach.
The Gauls told him that they were well aware of the capture of the city
and the destruction of those who had tried to attack him.
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The
elders of the fortified villages
presented themselves in the guise of envoys, and declared that the
wholesome
example of others' suffering had taught them to prefer the friendship
of
the Carthaginians to the risk of learning at first hand of their
military
might.
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They explained that
this was why they had come to meet
him, since they had no desire to do him harm, nor to suffer any
themselves,
and they promised to deliver up hostages from among their own people.
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They
were willing, in consequence, to submit
to Hannibal's orders, to supply him with guides and provisions, and to
offer hostages as a guarantee of their good faith.
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Hannibal was
reluctant to believe these assurances and
hesitated for a long time; then in the end he decided that if he
accepted
their overtures he might make them more pacific and less inclined to
attack
him, but that if he refused, he would only provoke them into open
hostility.
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Hannibal
was too cautious to take what they
said at its face value, but was unwilling to reject the offer out of
hand,
lest a refusal should drive them into open hostility;
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So he agreed to
their proposals and pretended to accept
their professions of friendship. The barbarians then handed over their
hostages, provided him with large numbers of cattle, and indeed put
themselves
unreservedly into his hands, whereupon Hannibal trusted them so far as
to engage them as guides for the next difficult section of his route.
For
two days they showed him the way,
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accordingly
he replied in friendly terms,
accepted the hostages, and made use of the supplies the natives had
offered;
he then followed their guides - but with proper precautions, and by no
means proceeding in loose order, as he might have done in friendly
territory.
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At the head of the
column were the cavalry and elephants;
Hannibal himself, with the pick of the infantry, brought up the rear,
keeping
his eyes open and alert for every contingency.
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but then the same
tribe gathered their forces, and corning
up behind the Carthaginians attacked them as they were passing through
steep and precipitous defile.
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Before long the
column found itself on a narrowing track,
one side of which was overhung by a precipitous wall of rock, and it
was
suddenly attacked.
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[54] This time
Hannibal's army would have been wiped
out, but, for the fact that his fears had not been allayed, and that
having
some foreboding of what might happen, he had stationed his mule train
and
his cavalry at the head of the column and the heavy infantry in the
rear.
The infantry covered his main body and were able to check the onslaught
of the barbarians, so that the disaster was less serious than it might
have been, but even so, a great number of men, pack animals and horses
perished in the attack.
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The enemy had gained
the higher ground and could move
along the slopes, and from there some of them rolled down rocks, while
others struck down their opponents with stones at close quarters.
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The
natives, springing from their places of
concealment, fiercely assaulted front and rear, leaping into the fray,
hurling missiles, rolling down rocks from the heights above.
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The Carthaginians
were thrown into such confusion and
felt so threatened by these tactics that Hannibal was compelled to
spend the
night with only half his force near a certain bare rock which
offered
some protection. Here he was separated from his cavalry. and from the
mule
train, and waited to cover their advance, until after a whole night's
struggle
they slowly and with great difficulty made their way out of the gorge.
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NIGHT
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The worst pressure
was on Hannibal's rear; to meet it,
his infantry faced-about - and it was clear enough that, had not the
rear
of the column been adequately protected, the Carthaginian losses would
have been appalling. Even as it was the moment was critical, and
disaster
only just averted; for Hannibal hesitated to send his own division into
the pass -to do so would have deprived the infantry of such support as
he was himself providing for the cavalry- and his hesitation enabled
the
tribesmen to deliver a flank attack, cut the whole column in two, and
establish
themselves on the track. As a result, Hannibal, for one night,
found
himself cut off from his cavalry and baggage-train.
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By the next
morning the enemy had broken off contact,
and Hannibal was able to rejoin the cavalry and baggage animals and
advance
towards the top of the pass.
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DAY 8
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[35] Next
day, however, as enemy activity weakened,
a junction was effected between the two halves of the column and the
defile
was successfully passed, though not without losses, especially amongst
the pack-animals.
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He was no longer
threatened by any concentration of barbarians,
but at a few points on the route he was harassed by scattered groups
who
took advantage of the ground to launch attacks on his front and rear
and
carry off some of the pack animals.
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Thenceforward there
was no concerted opposition, the
natives confining themselves to mere raids, in small parties, on front
or rear, as the nature of the ground dictated, or as groups of
stragglers,
left behind or pressing on ahead of the column as the case might be,
offered
a tempting prey.
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His best resource in
this situation were the elephants,
for the enemy were terrified by their strange appearance, and never
dared
to approach the part of the column in which they were stationed.
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The elephants proved
both a blessing and a curse: for
though getting them along the narrow and precipitous tracks caused
serious
delay, they were none the less a protection to the troops, as the
natives,
never having seen such creatures before, were afraid to come near them.
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On the ninth
day of his march [1]
Hannibal reached the top of the pass, and there he pitched
camp
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DAY 9
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On the
ninth day [1] the army
reached the summit. Most of the climb had been over trackless
mountain-sides;
frequently a wrong route was taken - sometimes through the deliberate
deception
of the guides, or, again, when some likely-looking valley would be
entered
by guess-work, without knowledge of whither it led.
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and
halted for two days to rest the survivors
of his army and wait for the stragglers.
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DAYS
10-11
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There
was a two days' halt on the summit,
to rest the men after the exhausting climb and the fighting.
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While he was there
many of the horses which had taken
fright and run away and a number of the mules which had thrown off
their
loads unexpectedly rejoined him: they had followed the trail of his
march
and now wandered back into the camp.
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Some of the
pack-animals which had fallen amongst the
rocks managed, by following the army's tracks, to find their way into
camp.
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[54] By this date it
was nearing the time of the setting
of the Pleiades, and snow was already gathering around the
mountain
crests. Hannibal saw that his men had lost heart because of the
sufferings
they had already endured and the hardships which they believed still
lay
ahead.
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The troops had
indeed endured hardships enough; but there
was worse to come. It was the season of the setting of the
Pleiades:
winter was near - and it began to snow.
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DAY 12
(Livy)
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Getting on
the move at dawn, the army struggled
slowly forward over snow-covered ground, the hopelessness of utter
exhaustion
in every face.
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So he called his
troops together and strove to raise
their spirits, and for this purpose he relied above all on the actual
sight
of Italy, which now stretched out before them, for the country lies so
close under these mountains that when the two are seen simultaneously
in
a panoramic view, the Alps seem to rise above the rest of the
landscape,
like a walled citadel above a city. Hannibal therefore directed his
men's
gaze towards the plains of the Po, and reminded them of the welcome
they
would receive from the Gauls who inhabited them. At the same time he
pointed
out the direction of Rome itself, and in this way he did something to
restore
their confidence.[2]
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Seeing their
despair, Hannibal rode ahead and at a point
of vantage which afforded a prospect of a vast extent of country, he
gave
the order to halt, pointing to Italy far below, and the Po Valley
beyond
the foothills of the Alps. 'My men,' he said, 'you are at this moment
passing
the protective barrier of Italy - nay more, you are walking over the
very
walls of Rome. Henceforward all will be easy going - no more hills to
climb.
After a fight or two you will have the capital of Italy, the citadel of
Rome, in the hollow of your hands.'
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The
next day he broke camp and began the descent.
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DAY 12
(Polybius)
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During this part of
his march he met none of the enemy
except for a few prowling marauders, but because of the snow and of the
dangers of his route he lost nearly as many men as he had done on the
ascent.
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The march continued,
more or less without molestation
from the natives, who confined themselves to petty raids when they saw
a chance of stealing something. Unfortunately, however, as in most
parts
of the Alps the descent on the Italian side, being shorter, is
correspondingly
steeper, the going was much more difficult than it had been during the
ascent.
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The track which led
down the mountainside was both narrow
and steep, and since neither the men nor the animals could be sure of
their
footing on account of the snow, any who stepped wide of the path or
stumbled
overbalanced and fell down the precipices.
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The
track was almost everywhere precipitous,
narrow, and slippery; it was impossible for a man to keep his feet; the
least stumble meant a fall, and a fall a slide, so that there was
indescribable
confusion, men and beasts stumbling and slipping on top of each other.
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These perils they
could endure, because by this time
they had become accustomed to such mischances, but at length they
reached
a place where the track was too narrow for the elephants or even the
pack
animals to pass.
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[36] Soon they found
themselves on the edge of a precipice
- a narrow cliff falling away so sheer that even a light-armed soldier
could hardly have got down it by feeling his way and clinging to such
bushes
and stumps as presented themselves.
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A previous landslide
had already carried away some three
hundred meters of the face of the mountain, while a recent one had made
the situation still worse. At this point the soldiers once more lost
their
nerve and came close to despair.
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It must always have
been a most awkward spot, but a recent
landslide had converted it on this occasion to a perpendicular drop of
nearly three hunderd meters. On the brink the cavalry drew rein - their
journey seemed to be over.
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Hannibal, in the
rear, did not yet know what had brought
the column to a halt; but when the message was passed to him that there
was no possibility of proceeding, he went in person to reconnoitre.
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Hannibal's first
thought was to avoid this impasse by
making a detour, but a fresh fall of snow made further progress
impossible
and he was compelled to abandon the idea.
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It was clear to him
that a detour would have to be made,
however long it might prove to be, over the trackless and untrodden
slopes
in the vicinity.
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[55] These
conditions were so unusual as to be almost
freakish. The new snow lying on top of the old, which had remained
there
from the previous winter, gave way easily, both because it was soft,
having
only just fallen, and because it was not yet deep. But when men and
beasts
had trodden through it and penetrated to the frozen snow underneath,
they
no longer sank into it, but found both their feet slipping from under
them,
as happens when people walk on ground which is covered with a coating
of
mud. What followed made the situation even more desperate. In the case
of the men, when they found they could not get a foothold on the lower
layer of snow they fell, and then, as they struggled to rise by using
their
hands and knees, slid downwards even faster on these, no matter what
they
clutched on the way, since the angle of the slope was so steep.
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But even so he was
no luckier; progress was impossible,
for though there was good foothold in the quite shallow layer of soft
fresh
snow which had covered the old snow underneath, nevertheless as soon as
it had been trampled and dispersed by the feet of all those men and
animals,
there was left to tread upon only the bare ice and liquid slush of
melting
snow underneath. The result was a horrible struggle, the ice affording
no foothold in any case, and least of all on a steep slope; when a man
tried by hands or knees to get on his feet again, even those useless
supports
slipped from under him and let him down; there were no stumps or roots
anywhere to afford a purchase to either foot or hand; in short, there
was
nothing for it but to roll and slither on the smooth ice and melting
snow.
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As for the animals,
when they fell and struggled to rise
they broke through the lower layer of snow, and there they stayed with
their loads, as though frozen to the earth, because of their weight and
the congealed state of the old snow.
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Sometimes the mules'
weight would drive their hoofs through
into the lower layer of old snow; they would fall and, once down,
lashing
savagely out in their struggles to rise, they would break right through
it, so that as often as not they were held as in a vice by a thick
layer
of hard ice.
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Hannibal was
compelled to give up the idea of attempting
a detour,
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and, after clearing
the snow away from the ridge, pitched
camp there.
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NIGHT
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[37] When it became
apparent that both men and beasts
were wearing themselves out to no purpose, a space was cleared -with
the
greatest labor because of the amount of snow to be dug and carted away-
and camp was pitched, high up on the ridge.
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Then he set his
troops to work on the immensely laborious
task of building up the path along the cliff. However, in one day he
had
made a track wide enough to take the mule train and the horses; he at
once
took these across, pitched camp below the snow-line and sent the
animals
out in search of pasture. Then he took the Numidians and set them in
relays
to the work of building up the path. After three days
of this toilsome
effort he succeeded in getting his elephants across, but the animals
were
in a miserable condition from hunger.
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DAY 13-16
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The next task was to
construct some sort of passable
track down the precipice, for by no other route could the army proceed.
It was necessary to cut through rock, a problem they solved by the
ingenious
application of heat and moisture; large trees were felled and lopped,
and
a huge pile of timber erected; this, with the opportune help of a
strong
wind, was set on fire, and when the rock was sufficiently heated the
men's
rations of sour wine were flung upon it, to render it friable. They
then
got to work with picks on the heated rock, and opened a sort of zigzag
track, to minimize the steepness of the descent, and were able, in
consequence,
to get the pack animals, and even the elephants, down it.
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The crests of the
Alps and the parts near the tops of
the passes are completely treeless and bare of vegetation, because of
the
snow which lies there continually between winter and summer, but the
slopes
half-way down on the Italian side are both grassy and well-wooded, and
are in general quite habitable.
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Four days
were spent in the neighborhood of this
precipice; the animals came near to dying of starvation, for on most of
the peaks nothing grows, or, if there is any pasture, the snow covers
it.
Lower down there are sunny hills and valleys and woods with streams
flowing
by: country, in fact, more worthy for men to dwell in.
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[56] After he had
reassembled all his forces Hannibal
resumed the descent, and three days after leaving the precipice I have
just described he arrived at the plains.
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There the beasts
were put out to pasture, and the troops
given three days' rest to recover from the fatigue of their
road-building.
Thence the descent was continued to the plains - a kindlier region,
with
kindlier inhabitants.
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