Cassius Dio (164-c.235) was a Greek by birth and a Roman by conviction, and one of the great historians of Antiquity. He became a senator during the reign of the emperor Commodus, was made consul by Septimius Severus (204), served as governor in Africa and Pannonia Superior, and had the rare distinction of being made consul twice, together with the emperor Severus Alexander (229).
Dio started his literary activity in the 190's and wrote his Roman History in the years 211-233. It is a marvelous book. Where we can compare it to other historical studies (e.g., the reign of the emperors Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, and Nero can be read with Tacitus' Annals), Dio is often better, and for certain periods (e.g., the reign of Augustus and the second century), he is our most important source.
Chapters 18-24 of Book 56 of Dio's Roman History are here presented in the translation by Earnest Cary.
Cassius Dio on the Battle in the Teutoburg Forest
[56.18.1] I shall now relate the events which had taken place in Germania during this period.
The Romans were holding portions of it - not entire regions, but merely such districts as happened to have been subdued, so that no record has been made of the fact -
[56.18.2] and soldiers of theirs were wintering there and cities were being founded. The barbarians were adapting themselves to Roman ways, were becoming accustomed to hold markets, and were meeting in peaceful assemblages. They had not, however, forgotten their ancestral habits, their native manners, their old life of independence, or the power derived from arms.
[56.18.3] Hence, so long as they were unlearning these customs gradually and by the way, as one may say, under careful watching, they were not disturbed by the change in their manner of life, and were becoming different without knowing it. But when Quinctilius Varus became governor of the province of Germania, and in the discharge of his official duties was administering the affairs of these peoples also, he strove to change them more rapidly. Besides issuing orders to them as if they were actually slaves of the Romans, he exacted money as he would from subject nations.
[56.18.4] To this they were in no mood to submit, for the leaders longed for their former ascendancy and the masses preferred their accustomed condition to foreign domination.
Now they did not openly revolt, since they saw that there were many Roman troops near the Rhine and many within their own borders.
[56.18.5] Instead, they received Varus, pretending that they would do all he demanded of them, and thus they drew him far away from the Rhine into the land of the Cherusci, toward the Visurgis,note[The Weser.] and there by behaving in a most peaceful and friendly manner led him to believe that they would live submissively without the presence of soldiers.
[56.19.1] Consequently he did not keep his legions together, as was proper in a hostile country, but distributed many of the soldiers to helpless communities, which asked for them for the alleged purpose of guarding various points, arresting robbers, or escorting provision trains.
[56.19.2] Among those deepest in the conspiracy and leaders of the plot and of the war were Arminius and Segimer, who were his constant companions and often shared his mess.
[56.19.3] He accordingly became confident, and expecting no harm, not only refused to believe all those who suspected what was going on and advised him to be on his guard, but actually rebuked them for being needlessly excited and slandering his friends.
Then there came an uprising, first on the part of those who lived at a distance from him, deliberately so arranged,
[56.19.4] in order that Varus should march against them and so be more easily overpowered while proceeding through what was supposed to be friendly country, instead of putting himself on his guard as he would do in case all became hostile to him at once. And so it came to pass.
They escorted him as he set out, and then begged to be excused from further attendance, in order, as they claimed, to assemble their allied forces, after which they would quietly come to his aid.
[56.19.5] Then they took charge of their troops, which were already in waiting somewhere, and after the men in each community had put to death the detachments of soldiers for which they had previously asked, they came upon Varus in the midst of forests by this time almost impenetrable. And there, at the very moment of revealing themselves as enemies instead of subjects, they wrought great and dire havoc.
[56.20.1] The mountains had an uneven surface broken by ravines, and the trees grew close together and very high.note[This description is entirely topical. The Germanic tribes were living on the edges of the earth, where the Roman and Greek geographers situated large mountains and forests.] Hence the Romans, even before the enemy assailed them, were having a hard time of it felling trees, building roads, and bridgingnote[Probably, Cassius Dio read pontes longi in his sources, and mistranslated it as "bridges".] places that required it.
[56.20.2] They had with them many waggons and many beasts of burden as in time of peace; moreover, not a few women and children and a large retinue of servants were following them - one more reason for their advancing in scattered groups.
[56.20.3] Meanwhile a violent rain and wind came up that separated them still further, while the ground, that had become slippery around the roots and logs, made walking very treacherous for them, and the tops of the trees kept breaking off and falling down, causing much confusion.
[56.20.4] While the Romans were in such difficulties, the barbarians suddenly surrounded them on all sides at once, coming through the densest thickets, as they were acquainted with the paths. At first they hurled their volleys from a distance; then, as no one defended himself and many were wounded, they approached closer to them.
[56.20.5] For the Romans were not proceeding in any regular order, but were mixed in helter-skelter with the waggons and the unarmed, and so, being unable to form readily anywhere in a body, and being fewer at every point than their assailants, they suffered greatly and could offer no resistance at all.
[56.21.1] Accordingly they encamped on the spot, after securing a suitable place, so far as that was possible on a wooded mountain; and afterwards they either burned or abandoned most of their waggons and everything else that was not absolutely necessary to them.
The next day they advanced in a little better order, and even reached open country, though they did not get off without loss.
[56.21.2] Upon setting out from there they plunged into the woods again, where they defended themselves against their assailants, but suffered their heaviest losses while doing so. For since they had to form their lines in a narrow space, in order that the cavalry and infantry together might run down the enemy, they collided frequently with one another and with the trees.
[56.21.3] They were still advancing when the fourth day dawned, and again a heavy downpour and violent wind assailed them, preventing them from going forward and even from standing securely, and moreover depriving them of the use of their weapons. For they could not handle their bows or their javelins with any success, nor, for that matter, their shields, which were thoroughly soaked.note[Experimental archaeologists have established that Roman shields did not become substantially heavier in the rain.]
[56.21.4] Their opponents, on the other hand, being for the most part lightly equipped, and able to approach and retire freely, suffered less from the storm. Furthermore, the enemy's forces had greatly increased, as many of those who had at first wavered joined them, largely in the hope of plunder, and thus they could more easily encircle and strike down the Romans, whose ranks were now thinned, many having perished in the earlier fighting.
[56.21.5] Varus, therefore, and all the more prominent officers, fearing that they should either be captured alive or be killed by their bitterest foes (for they had already been wounded), made bold to do a thing that was terrible yet unavoidable: they took their own lives.
[56.22.1] When news of this had spread, none of the rest, even if he had any strength left, defended himself any longer. Some imitated their leader, and others, casting aside their arms, allowed anybody who pleased to slay them; for to flee was impossible, however much one might desire to do so.
[56.22.2] Every man, therefore, and every horse was cut down without fear of resistance, and the [lacuna]
[56.22.2a] And the barbarians occupied all the strongholds save one,note[Velleius Paterculus (History, 2.120.3) calls this fortress Aliso. The commander was Lucius Caedicius. Go here for the details.] their delay at which prevented them from either crossing the Rhine or invading Gaul. Yet they found themselves unable to reduce this fortress, because they did not understand the conduct of sieges, and because the Romans employed numerous archers, who repeatedly repulsed them and destroyed large numbers of them.
[56.22.2b] Later they learned that the Romans had posted a guard at the Rhine, and that Tiberius was approaching with an imposing army. Therefore most of the barbarians retired from the fortress, and even the detachment still left there withdrew to a considerable distance, so as not to be injured by sudden sallies on the part of the garrison, and then kept watch of the roads, hoping to capture the garrison through the failure of their provisions.
The Romans inside, so long as they had plenty of food, remained where they were, awaiting relief; but when no one came to their assistance and they were also hard pressed by hunger, they waited merely for a stormy night and then stole forth. Now the soldiers were but few, the unarmed many.
[56.22.2c] They succeeded in getting past the foe's first and second outposts, but when they reached the third, they were discovered, for the women and children, by reason of their fatigue and fear as well as on account of the darkness and cold, kept calling to the warriors to come back.
[56.22.3] And they would all have perished or been captured, had the barbarians not been occupied in seizing the plunder. This afforded an opportunity for the most hardy to get some distance away, and the trumpeters with them by sounding the signal for a double-quick march caused the enemy to think that they had been sent by Asprenas.note[Lucius Nonius Asprenas, the commander of the army of Germania Superior. He was a relative of Varus.]
[56.22.4] Therefore the foe ceased his pursuit, and Asprenas, upon learning what was taking place, actually did render them assistance. Some of the prisoners were afterwards ransomed by their relatives and returned from captivity; for this was permitted on condition that the men ransomed should remain outside of Italy. This, however, occurred later.
[56.23.1] Augustus, when he learned of the disaster to Varus, rent his garments, as some report,note[E.g., Suetonius.] and mourned greatly, not only because of the soldiers who had been lost, but also because of his fear for the German and Gallic provinces, and particularly because he expected that the enemy would march against Italy and against Rome itself. For there were no citizens of military age left worth mentioning, and the allied forces that were of any value had suffered severely.
[56.23.2] Nevertheless, he made preparations as best he could in view of the circumstances; and when no men of military age showed a willingness to be enrolled, he made them draw lots, depriving of his property and disfranchising every fifth man of those still under thirty-five and every tenth man among those who had passed that age.
[56.23.3] Finally, as a great many paid no heed to him even then, he put some to death. He chose by lot as many as he could of those who had already completed their term of service and of the freedmen, and after enrolling them sent them in haste with Tiberius into the province of Germania.note[One of the commanders of these reinforcements was Velleius Paterculus, who was, in that year, quaestor.]
[56.23.4] And as there were in Rome a large number of Gauls and Germans, some of them serving in the praetorian guard and others sojourning there for various reasons, he feared they might begin a rebellion; hence he sent away such as were in his body-guardnote[Probably Batavians.] to certain islands and ordered those who were unarmed to leave the city.
[56.24.1] This was the way he handled matters at that time; and none of the usual business was carried on nor were the festivals celebrated. Later, when he heard that some of the soldiers had been saved, that the Germanies were garrisoned, and that the enemy did not venture to come even to the Rhine, he ceased to be alarmed and paused to consider the matter.
[56.24.2] For a catastrophe so great and sudden as this, it seemed to him, could have been due to nothing else than the wrath of some divinity; moreover, by reason of the portents which occurred both before the defeat and afterwards, he was strongly inclined to suspect some superhuman agency.
[56.24.3] For the temple of Mars in the field of the same namenote[The Field of Mars.] was struck by lightning, and many locusts flew into the very city and were devoured by swallows; the peaks of the Alps seemed to collapse upon one another and to send up three columns of fire; the sky in many places seemed ablaze
[5.24.4] and numerous comets appeared at one and the same time; spears seemed to dart from the north and to fall in the direction of the Roman camps; bees formed their combs about the altars in the camps; a statue of Victory that was in the province of Germania and faced the enemy's territory turned about to face Italy;
[5.24.5] and in one instance there was a futile battle and conflict of the soldiers over the eagles in the camps, the soldiers believing that the barbarians had fallen upon them.